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Summary
The fight against poverty and underdevelopment in Africa is amongst
others dependent on how successfully the socio-economic rights protected
in both the regional and universal instruments are concretised. The last 20
years since the adoption of the African Charter show a slow but steady
move towards such concretisation. The African Commission has moved
from a stage of redundancy, when not much was done to give normative
content to the rights, to a stage of progression, in which the African Com-
mission has started giving content to the rights. In spite of this, the recom-
mendations of the African Commission are yet to be taken seriously not only
by state parties, but by the African Union. There is no reliable mechanism to
enforce the recommendations of the African Commission and, as the African
Court on Human and People’s Rights begins operation, its success is likely to
be hampered by the same problem. This is in spite of the fact that the
African Court has a wide remedial mandate in comparison to the African
Commission. As the African Court propels the African human rights system
into a stage of significant strides, this is the biggest obstacle in its way. The
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African Union is central in sanctioning states that fail to implement the
judgments of the African Court. However, history shows that the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government has always been reluctant to sanction its
members. Unless there is a change of heart and more commitment to
human rights, this practice is likely to persist and thereby negatively impact
on the rights protected by the African Charter.
1 Introduction
Africa’s trademark as a continent is punctuated by poverty, ignorance,
diseases and a high level of underdevelopment not comparable to other
continents. Poverty in Africa has been described as a harsh reality that
translates into half the population living on less than one dollar a day;
not having access to safe drinking water; and more than two million
infants dying annually before reaching their first birthday.1 Recent sta-
tistics show a very wide gap in life span between African and European
countries: Zimbabwe at 37,9, Zambia at 39 and Angola at 39,9. On the
other side of the spectrum, Switzerland is at 80,6, Sweden at 80,4 and
France at 79,7.2
Africa’s poverty has been exacerbated by the HIV/AIDS epidemic; out
of the 38,6 million people living with HIV/AIDS worldwide, 24,5 million
are in sub-Saharan Africa.3 This epidemic has contributed to the decline
in the state of health and increased mortality rates of many Africans; it
has also contributed to unemployment arising from physical incapacity
and the consequential loss of income. Household savings have been
depleted to access care for the sick and income inflows cut off due to
sickness and attending to the sick.4 Governments have been forced to
divert resources that would have otherwise been used for developmen-
tal and other health purpose towards the fight against the epidemic.5 It
is in this context that the protection of economic, social and cultural
1 UNDP The primacy of pro poor policies for growth http://www.undp.org/rba/
poverty.html (accessed 5 June 2006).
2 ‘AIDS is cutting African life span to 30 year low, report says’ The New York Times 6 June
2006.
3 UNAIDS 2006 Report on the global AIDS epidemic 13 http://www.unaids.org/ en/
HIV data/2006GlobalReport/default.asp (accessed 7 June 2006) 4. The report also
shows that in the last 25 years, close to 40 million children have been orphaned by
AIDS.
4 Uganda AIDS Commission ‘HIV/AIDS in Uganda’ http://www.aidsuganda.org/
(accessed 13 June 2006).
5 Eg, the National Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS Activities in Uganda: 2000/1
2005/6 projected that of 3,3% of government expenditure would be on HIV/AIDS;
see D Ddamulira HIV/AIDS spending study International component: The case of
Uganda (2002) 12 http://www.idasa.org.za/ gbOutputFiles. asp?WriteContent=Y&R
ID=649 (accessed 16 June 2006).
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rights (socio-economic rights)6 on the continent should be under-
stood.7
This paper sets out to review the approach of the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) in enforcing the
socio-economic rights protected by the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)8 in the 20 years since it entered into
force. The approach of the African Commission has occurred in two
stages, the first stage being the ‘redundancy’ stage and the second the
‘progression’ stage. The first stage describes that period in time when
very little was done in developing the normative content of the rights
and elucidating on the obligations they engender. The second stage
represents a period when the African Commission started giving con-
tent to the rights and construing the obligation they engender. The
stage of ‘significant strides’ is only prospective and premised on the
potential success of the African human rights system as seen through
the prism of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Court).
The contribution of this paper is not only its description of the stages
defined above, but its account of the factors dictating the direction of
the stages. The paper places the stages in context by tracing the genesis
of socio-economic rights in Africa and briefly describing their nature in
the African Charter. The stages are described by using examples of
some of the major communications decided by the African Commission
in the respective stages. The paper also highlights some of the obstacles
likely to be encountered by the African Court as it propels socio-eco-
nomic rights into a third stage of significant strides.
2 The genesis of socio-economic rights in Africa
Events and ideological developments that preceded the adoption of the
African Charter are important in understanding the justification for the
inclusion of socio-economic rights in this instrument. When Africa
emerged from colonial rule in the early 1960s, there was consensus
that the ‘independent state’ should assume the responsibility of cham-
6 The term ‘socio economic rights’ is used for convenience purposes. It is not in any
manner intended to undermine the importance of cultural rights and their position as
part of the African Charter. Later in this article I give examples of African cultural
practices that have relevance in respect of the enjoyment of socio economic rights.
7 Though undocumented as human rights abuses, violations of the rights to health,
education, food, water, housing, environment and social security have taken place in
Africa on a large scale; N Udombana ‘Towards the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights: Better late than never’ (2000) 3 Yale Human Rights and Development
Law Journal 45.
8 Adopted on 27 June 1981 by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in
Nairobi, Kenya OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, (1982) 21 International Legal Materials
58, entered into force 21 October 1986.
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pioning rapid political, social and economic reforms. The colonial state
had been exploitative, large-scale exploitation of natural resources had
taken place but not much returned to the Africans in the form of socio-
economic development.9 According to Oliver and Atmore,10 the colo-
nial state felt that its main duty in Africa was to maintain law and order
and to do so without expense to the European taxpayer. They cite
education as an example; it was left to the private enterprises of church
missions. To maintain law and order, as was perceived by the colonial
government, required adoption of draconian laws that intruded on all
aspects of African life. It is therefore not surprising that the state was
characterised by massive violation of civil and political rights.11 On the
economy side, there is no doubt that colonialism fast-tracked Africa’s
integration in the global economy. But as argued by Mamdani, this
integration was one-sided and outward-looking, the economies were
groomed as crop exporters and importers of necessaries which created
dependence.12 Mdani also demonstrates how the colonial economy
denied Africans self-sustenance and made them dependent on the
economy which came with several impositions that further impover-
ished the African.13
As one scholar has put it, ‘African states with their inherited weak
economies thought their primary task was to overcome poverty, dis-
ease, malnutrition, illiteracy, etc.’14 The post-colonial African leaders
have persistently resisted human rights as an agent for human devel-
opment. They believe that what Africa needs are sound economic poli-
cies implemented without detractions created by notions of human
rights. But in spite of the enforcement of several economic policies on
the continent, self-sustenance has not be realised. The problem with
the independent African state is that it has recycled and used in the
same manner the relationship of subjection, as described by
Mbembe,15 between itself and the state as was created by colonialism.
Unless economic policies integrate the African individual in its mak-
ing, give him or her a voice and improve his or her socio-economic
wellbeing, the policies remain tools of white collar debate. The African
peasantry can only be empowered to participate in this debate and
9 J Oloka Onyango ‘Beyond the rhetoric: Reinvigorating the struggle for economic and
social rights in Africa’ University of Minnesota Human Rights Library http://
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/Oloka Onyango.html (accessed 20 June 2006).
10 R Oliver & A Atmore Africa since 1800 (1994) 124.
11 For a detailed account of the extent of human rights violations by the colonial state,
see V Nmehielle The African human rights system: Its laws, practice and institutions
(2001) 17 29.
12 M Mamdani Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of later colonialism
(1996) 145.
13 n 12 above, 6 147.
14 E Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The practice and
procedures (1996) 5.
15 A Mbembe On the post colony (2001) 34.
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influence its direction in their favour if they are empowered through
human rights norms. Emphasis on public wellbeing in white collar
debates tends to alienate the individual and his needs; an equitable
balance should be made between the requirements of the public
well-being and the rights of the individual.16 This can be done through
provisions that protect both collective and individual socio-economic
rights and integrate them as part of policy conception and implemen-
tation.
3 Towards the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights
Express references to the need to protect socio-economics emerged
from two colloquiums held in 1978: the Butare Colloquium17 and the
Dakar Colloquium,18 both on human rights and development. The
participants at the Butare Colloquium discussed the relationship
between human rights and development and concluded that the lack
of resources in many African countries did not justify lack of respect for
civil and political rights and for socio-economic rights.19 At the Dakar
Colloquium, it was concluded that human rights could not be reduced
to civil and political rights, socio-economic rights needed particular
attention as the rights were mutually interdependent.20 Subsequent
efforts, initiated mainly by the United Nations (UN) Commission on
Human Rights, directed to establishment of a human rights system
for Africa failed, mainly because of the reluctance of African leaders to
cede their sovereignty to a system of human rights.21
However, calamitous events, especially in the 1970s, leading to the
rise of dictatorships in some African countries, drew the Organization of
the African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), to accepting that
there was a need to protect human rights on the continent. At its 16th
ordinary session, 16 to 20 July 1979, the OAU Assembly of Heads of
State and Government expressed its commitment to the protection of
16 First Conference of French Speaking African Jurists, held in Dakar, Senegal 5 9 January
1967, 5, as quoted by F Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights:
A comprehensive agenda for human dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa (2003)
21.
17 Human Rights and Economic Development in Francophone Africa, a colloquium
organised by the Institute of International Law and Economic Development
(Washington DC) and the Faculty of Law of the National University of Rwanda 3 7 July
1978; see Ouguergouz (n 16 above) 23 24.
18 Organised by Association Sénégalaise d’Études et de Recherches Juridiques and by the
International Commission of Jurists, September 1978; see Ouguergouz (n 16 above)
24.
19 Ouguergouz (n 16 above) 24.
20 Ouguergouz (n 16 above) 25.
21 Nmehielle (n 11 above) 70; see also Ankumah (n 14 above) 5.
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human and peoples’ rights, and more particularly the right to develop-
ment.22 It is not very clear why the right to development was particu-
larly singled out; one could but guess that this was motivated by the
high levels of underdevelopment prevalent on the continent. The Afri-
can leaders could have intended to translate the political obligations
assumed by the independent state to champion development into legal
obligations based on human rights.
Emphasis on the right to development meant that the OAU was
looking beyond merely civil and political rights, though at this stage
this could have been unconsciously. One could also argue that empha-
sis on the right to development was because of the need to create a sort
of bulwark against continued economic exploitation by the former
colonial powers and to the redress exploitation that had taken
place.23 Addressing the meeting of experts who convened in Dakar
to sketch the way forward for an African human rights instrument,
President Senghor of Senegal indicated that the right to development
deserved a particular place because it embraced all socio-economic
rights as well as civil and political rights.24 It is in line with this call
that the African Charter was drafted.
4 The African Charter: A leap beyond ideological
cleavages
Although the African Charter was adopted at the height of the Cold
War, it was able to surmount the ideological disputes that had led to
socio-economic rights being condemned to an inferior status.25 The
African Charter was able to proclaim that civil and political rights and
socio-economic rights are indivisible. This portrayed Africa as offering
‘ripe ground for challenging the universality of international law prin-
ciples’.26
Senghor’s message played a very important role in guiding the draf-
ters; when the Charter was adopted at the Eighteenth Assembly of
22 AHG/Dec 115 (XVI) Rev 1 ‘Decision on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa’, 16th
ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Monrovia,
Liberia 16 20 July 1979. The resolution called upon the OAU Secretary General to
organise, as soon as possible, a restricted meeting of highly qualified experts to
prepare a preliminary draft of the African Charter.
23 I would like to acknowledge Prof Sandra Liebenberg for drawing this argument to my
attention.
24 Address delivered by Mr Leopold Sedar Senghor, President of Senegal, OAU DOC
CAB/LEG/67/5; Ouguergouz (n 16 above) 41.
25 See C Odinkalu ‘Implementing economic, social and cultural rights under the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in M Evans & R Murray The African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights: The system in practice, 1986 2000 (2002) 181.
26 R Murray The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and international law
(2000) 11.
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Heads of State and Government, 24 to 28 June 1981 in Nairobi, socio-
economic rights appeared along side civil and political rights without
any distinction. Indeed, the African Charter proclaims that:27
[I]t is . . . essential to pay particular attention to the right to development and
that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and
cultural rights in their conception as well as universality . . . that the satisfac-
tion of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment
of civil and political rights.
This is a fundamental leap away from the ideological differences that
had proclaimed that civil and political rights were pure rights while
socio-economic rights were inferior rights. Literally, one could interpret
the preamble as suggesting that civil and political rights are dependent
on socio-economic rights without a reverse statement. As I have sug-
gested elsewhere,28 socio-economic rights and civil and political rights
are symbiotic — they depend on each other in a two way manner. In
spite of this, civil and political rights continue to be hoisted above socio-
economic rights. In the African context it is important that both cate-
gories of rights be respected because freedom to vote could be as
important to the impoverished African as the right to health. The
vote could for instance be used to influence decisions as regards the
health system.
The bifurcation of human rights, contrary to the spirit of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),29 led to the adop-
tion of two different covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (CCPR), protecting civil and political rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR), protecting socio-economic rights.
According to Scott and Macklem, the split was not influenced by the
view that socio-economic rights are somehow inferior to civil and poli-
tical rights. ‘Rather, social rights were not viewed as justiciable because
courts, or court-like bodies, were not thought to be competent bodies
to deal with them.’30 A reporting mechanism, and not a complaints
procedure, was considered most suitable for enforcement of socio-eco-
nomic rights.31 When one examines the arguments that have been
advanced to oppose socio-economic rights, some of them question
27 Preamble, para 8.
28 C Mbazira ‘A path to realising economic, social and cultural rights in Africa? A critique
of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development’ (2004) 4 African Human Rights Law
Journal 35.
29 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A(III) of 10 December
1948.
30 C Scott & P Macklem ‘Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? Social
rights in a new South African Constitution’ (1992) 141 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 89.
31 K Arambulo Strengthening the supervision of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Theoretical and procedural aspects (1999) 26.
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the fabric of socio-economic rights as rights.32 However, these argu-
ments are misconceived; socio-economic rights also engender negative
obligations and civil and political rights engender positive obligations as
well.33 It is also true that the implementation of civil and political rights,
just like the socio-economic rights, requires resources.34
5 Normative content of the African Charter
The African Charter guarantees a broad range of socio-economic rights.
Although some of the Charter’s provisions mirror CESCR, there are
significant differences between these instruments. While CESCR requires
‘progressive realisation’ of socio-economic rights subject ‘to the max-
imum of the available resources’, the African Charter does not. Article 1,
which appears to be definitive of the broad nature of the obligations of
states, merely provides that:
The member states of the [African Union] parties to the present Charter shall
recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall
undertake to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to them.
This provision raises a number of issues. On its literal interpretation it
appears to suggest the view that the realisation of all the rights in the
African Charter, including socio-economic rights, are not subject to any
conditions. The provision has in fact led some commentators to state
that except for the right to health, the obligations in respect of other
socio-economic rights are stated as being immediate.35 This position
appears very attractive in reaction to the view that socio-economic
rights are not human rights. In fact, the Commission itself appears to
have been tempted to adopt this position when it stated that although
it was aware of Africa’s economic difficulties all rights have to be imple-
mented immediately.36 However, the perception of the immediacy of
the rights in the African Charter raises one question: Considering Afri-
ca’s economic circumstances, is it practicable to realise all the socio-
economic rights immediately? The answer is a definite no. While some
32 M Cranston What are human rights? (1973) as quoted by Arambulo (n 31 above) 58;
see also C Orwin & T Pangle ‘The philosophical foundation of human rights’ in
F Plattner (ed) Human rights in our time Essays in memory of Victor Baras (1984) 16.
33 M Sepúlveda The nature of the obligations under the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2003) 125 126.
34 P Alston & G Quinn ‘The nature and scope of states parties’ obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 8 Human
Rights Quarterly 172; see also A Eide ‘Realisation of social and economic rights and the
minimum threshold approach’ (1989) 10 Human Rights Law Journal 41; In re
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC).
35 Odinkalu (n 25 above) 196.
36 Presentation of the Third Annual Activity Report by Prof Umozurike, Chairperson of
the African Commission to the 26th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the OAU, 9 11 July 1990.
340 (2006) 6 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
levels of the obligations, such as respect, may be realised immediately,
the protection, promotion and fulfilment of socio-economic rights
requires substantial resources. Many, if not all, African states have
very poor economies riddled by corruption, poor planning and insig-
nificance in the global economy save as consumers. It is hard for such
economies to immediately overcome their structural problems and to
marshal the resources necessary to provide for all socio-economic needs
immediately. At best, human rights obligations should compel the Afri-
can leaders to ensure that they do whatever is reasonable to improve
the resources necessary for socio-economic rights realisation and to
utilise the available resources maximally.
Though civil and political rights too require resources to protect,
promote, and fulfil,37 generally there are significant differences in the
levels of resource required between the two categories of rights. It is
therefore does not come as a surprise that even countries endowed
with economic resources are yet to fully realise socio-economic rights
and have always raised the defence of resources.38 On this note I agree
with Nmehielle that the debate on the justiciability of socio-economic
rights under the Charter should not assume an extreme posture.39 It is
important that the socio-economic rights in the African Charter be
realised progressively due to the underdevelopment of most African
countries,40 though states have to begin taking immediate measures.
In addition to Africa’s underdevelopment, it is also important that socio-
economic rights be realised progressively because the standards for
their full realisation are dynamic; they are defined by changing socio-
economic circumstances and establish shifting standards. This is
because peoples’ standards must improve on a continuous basis.
There is no stage at which one can say that the zenith of human
socio-economic development has been reached.
5.1 Socio-economic rights in the African Charter
The African Charter protects a broad range of socio-economic rights
and also a number of collective rights relevant to socio-economic
rights. Some of the collective rights have elements that are directly
relevant to socio-economic rights. In this respect, the African Charter
serves a good purpose by not making distinctions on the basis of the
outdated generational description of rights. The rights include
37 See Constitutional Court of South Africa in In re Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa (n 34 above).
38 Eg, see the Canadian case of Eldridge & Others v British Columbia & Others (Attorney
General) [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577.
39 Nmehielle (n 11 above) 124.
40 Ankumah (n 14 above) 144.
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equitable and satisfactory conditions of work,41 right to health,42 right
to education,43 protection of the family,44 right to self-determination,45
right to dispose of wealth and natural resources,46 right to economic,
social and cultural development,47 right to peace,48 and right to a
satisfactory and favourable environment.49
It is not my intention to discuss the normative content of each of
these rights as this has been covered adequately by a number of
authors.50 But just to point out a few things, some of these rights are
drafted along the same lines as CESCR. However, some distinctions can
be registered. A number of rights such as development are not pro-
tected in CESCR though recognised by the UN.51 Provisions on rights
such as health and work are not as extensively drafted as their counter-
parts in CESCR. In spite of this, their construction could still lead to their
understanding in an extensive manner.
The difference between the African Charter and CESCR reflects a
desire on the part of the drafters of the former to produce an exclusively
African instrument. They could have copied and reproduced the provi-
sions of CESCR and CCPR in the area of civil and political rights. But
they chose not to, this is because they wanted to produce a distinctively
African instrument elaborating the normative understanding of human
rights in the African context. However, the African states are also parties
to the global instruments and considerable jurisprudence has been
generated on these global instruments. This compels the African Com-
mission, as well as the African Court, to refer to the global instruments
and jurisprudence. I will revert to this argument later.
6 Twenty years of losses and gains: From redundancy
to progression and significant strides
6.1 The redundancy stage
The redundancy stage represents a period in time when the African










50 See Nmehielle (n 11 above); Ouguergouz (n 16 above); Odinkalu (n 25 above);
Murray (n 26 above).
51 See United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development GA
Res 41/128, Annex, 41GAOR Supp (No 53).
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the African Charter their fullest interpretation.52 For socio-economic
rights, this was exacerbated by the fact that in the initial years not so
many complaints invoking socio-economic rights provisions were filed.
This redundancy also represents the high degree of apathy exhibited
towards socio-economic rights at the international human rights arena.
Though theoretically the African Charter emphasises the indivisibility of
civil and political rights and socio-economic rights, translating this into
practice and transcending the apathy has not been a straightforward
path.
Another factor that precipitated the redundancy stage relates to the
weaknesses of the African Commission in its initial years of operation. So
many factors have been identified as contributing to the ineffectiveness
of the African Commission in exercising its mandate. Doubts have been
expressed about the independence and impartiality of the members of
the African Commission. Since its commencement, a sizeable number
of commissioners have simultaneously held posts in the public service of
their countries, either as attorneys-general, cabinet ministers or ambas-
sadors. This appears to have compromised their independence and
stopped them from condemning their governments.
The effectiveness of the African Commission has also been affected by
promotion of confidentiality of its proceedings which has in the past
eroded the culture of accountability on its part.53 A decision maker who
makes a decision, knowing that such decision must be justified, will act
more carefully and pay attention to all the relevant issues.54 The African
Commission has in the past missed the opportunity of being such a
decision maker because of its confidentiality. This could be one of the
factors why its initial decisions were sloppy as the possibility of public
criticism was limited.
The African Commission has also been suffering from resource defi-
ciencies; it was under-funded by the OAU and continues to be under-
funded by the AU. This has affected all activities of the Commission,
including its capacity to do research and deliver well-reasoned legal
opinions. At the moment most of the few technical personnel at the
Commission’s Secretariat are funded by donors on a periodic basis, and
usually leave the Commission at times when their experience becomes
most relevant.
The Commission has for a long time been a ‘toothless bull-dog’, a
point I shall revert to later below. Initially, the African Commission was
conceived as a promotional institution. The OAU was reluctant to give
the Commission a significant protective role. This is reflected in the
52 See Ankumah (n 14 above) 2.
53 Art 59(1) of the African Charter provides that all measures taken within the provisions
of ch III shall remain confidential until such time as the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government shall otherwise decide.
54 See E Mureinik ‘A bridge to where? Introduction to the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10
South African Journal on Human Rights 31.
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vagueness of the provisions that empower the Commission to entertain
and consider individual communications. While the African Charter
makes express provisions empowering the African Commission to
entertain and consider state complaints,55 there are no corresponding
provisions in respect of individual complaints. All that the Charter says is
that before each session, the Secretary of the Commission shall make a
list of the communications, other than those of state parties, and trans-
mit them to the members of the Commission who shall indicate which
communications should be considered.56 Though the Commission has
exploited the vagueness to assert its powers to hear individual com-
plaints, its efforts in this regard have been drawn back by the absence of
an effective remedial and enforcement mechanism.57
As seen in the next section, all socio-economic rights decisions made
by the African Commission during the redundancy stage are inade-
quate in normative terms. In these decisions, there is no effort on the
part of the Commission to draw from international human rights law in
the area of socio-economic rights. Most decisions just declare that the
state has violated rights without elaborating the normative basis of the
right. But we should not pay a blind eye to the fact that at this stage not
all communications were properly argued; yet the failure of most states
to defend the communications denied the Commission the opportunity
to hand down reasoned judgments in a balanced manner. At the same
time, one sees communications that were defended, yet they suffer
from the same weaknesses from all perspectives.
6.1.1 Major decisions during the redundancy stage
The communications discussed under this heading represent the very
few that invoked, in one way or another, together with civil and poli-
tical rights and socio-economic rights provisions in the African Charter.
Some common features run through all of them. Apart from consolidat-
ing several communications, they are not elaborate; the normative con-
tent of the rights is not discussed adequately. Some are not defended
by the state, yet in the defended ones there is no elaboration of the
legal arguments of the state or of the applicants in the final decision.
There does not appear to be adequate legal research put in on the part
of the African Commission, justification of findings by authoritative
international human rights law sources is lacking. This is so even
where in some cases there is international literature, which is also easily
accessible, like the standards of treatment of prisoners.58 In remedial
55 Art 47.
56 Art 55(1).
57 E Welch ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A five year report
and assessment’ (1992) 14 Human Rights Quarterly 49.
58 Like the UN Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted and proclaimed
by General Assembly Resolution 45/111 of 14 December 1990.
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terms, other than make simple declarations of violation of rights, the
African Commission does not make any substantive recommendations
to remedy the violations.
In Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire,59 it was alleged that the mis-
management of public finances, the failure to provide basic services, the
shortage of medicines and closure of schools and universities was a
violation of the African Charter.60 In finding that there was a violation
of the right to health, the African Commission regurgitates article 16 of
the African Charter and without explanation concludes that there is a
violation of the Charter.61 The Commission also held that the failure of
the government to provide services such as safe drinking water and
electricity and the shortage of medicines also amounted to violation
of the right to health. One could read the Commission here as saying
that the right to health gives rise to such rights as water and electricity,
rights not expressly protected by the Charter. However, the scanty
nature of the decision does not give chance for concrete imputation
on the Commission of this position. Also, in an unelaborated manner,
the Commission concluded that the closure of universities and second-
ary schools constituted a violation of the right to education in article
17.62 It is, however, apparent from the operative part of the decision
that the Commission did not formally hold that article 17 had been
violated.
It has been argued that this communication appears to impose on
the state the obligation to fulfil socio-economic rights, though it does
this in a terse manner.63 The Commission should have seized the
opportunity to elaborate on the right to education, especially consider-
ing the fact that article 17 does not detail the content of this right. This
is in comparison to article 13 of CESCR, which details the right as
comprising of compulsory and free primary education and access to
secondary and higher education.
The above communication may be contrasted with the slightly ela-
borate Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme and Others v Angola,64
also touching on the right to education, but also on the right to work.
The communication arose from the mass rounding up and expulsion in
1996 of West African citizens from Angola by the government. The
Commission found the expulsion, in addition to other rights, to have
violated the right to education and the right to work. It was stated that
though the Republic of Angola was facing economic difficulties this did




63 F Viljoen ‘The justiciability of socio economic and cultural rights: Experience and
problems’ (unpublished paper on file with author) 23.
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not justify radical measures against non-nationals.65 The deportations
were found to have called into question such rights as education and
the right to work, amongst others. The Commission also held that
article 2 of the Charter (non-discrimination) obligates states to ensure
that all persons in its territory, nationals or non-nationals, enjoy all the
rights guaranteed.66 But again the communication falls short of an
elaboration of the right to education and how it became applicable
to the applicants. This could be associated with the scanty nature of
the facts and the failure of the Commission to interrogate them fully.
In International Pen and Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria,67
the right to health was brought into issue. The communication, a con-
solidation of four communications,68 arose from the detention of Ken
Saro-Wiwa, a writer and Ogoni rights activist, together with others.
They had been detained by the Nigerian Abacha government following
the death of four people and consequent riots in the oil producing
region of Ogoniland. The detainees were tried by a military tribunal
and sentenced to death. In spite of interim measures adopted by the
Commission pending the disposal of the communication, the ‘convicts’
were executed on 10 November 1995.69 It was alleged that while in
detention Saro-Wiwa had been severely beaten and in spite of his high
blood pressure, had been denied access to medicine and a doctor.70
Without elaboration of the content of the right to health, the African
Commission held that the responsibility of the state in respect of the
right to health is heightened when a person is in detention. In such
cases a person’s integrity and wellbeing are completely dependent on
the state. It was declared that the denial of access by Saro-Wiwa to a
qualified doctor was a violation of article 16 of the African Charter.71
Again, the decision is not elaborate. In spite of this, however, it is
important in as far as it states that prisoners enjoy special protection
and are wholly dependent on the state for their wellbeing. In Africa, as
well as other parts of the world, prisoners are ostracised and removed
from society. They are considered moral outcasts not worthy of protec-
tion or entitled to any human rights. The African Commission and the
African Court could, in future, build on this case to elaborate on the
health rights of prisoners and to redeem them as moral beings entitled
to live as wholesome humans.
The massive violation of prisoners’ socio-economic rights is seen
again in Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania,72 also con-
65 Para 16.
66 Para 18.
67 (2000) AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 1998).
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solidating several communications. In reaction to popular disapproval
of racial marginalisation of black people in the country, the government
detained hordes of people under the most inhumane conditions. The
prisoners, who had survived execution, were denied adequate food and
medical attention, and as a result some had died in detention. Their
cells were infested with bedbugs, lice and cockroaches. The prisoners
slept in overcrowded cells on dirty floors without any blankets.73 Again,
the communication, in a shorthand manner, restates the responsibility
of the state towards prisoners as regards their right to health.74 The
African Commission hastily, and without further elaboration, con-
demned the conditions of detention under article 5, which prohibits
torture and degrading treatment or punishment.75 One would have
expected the Commission to give a detailed elaboration of the obliga-
tions of states towards prisoners in relation to their socio-economic
rights and to refer to international standards in this respect.
6.1.2 The progression stage
The progression stage, which is the current stage, represents a time
when the African Commission has began to surmount some of its weak-
nesses and to proclaim socio-economic rights in a more progressive
manner. This stage is highlighted by two important decisions: Social
and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria
(SERAC case)76 and Purohit and Another v The Gambia (Purohit case).77
In these cases, discussed later in detail, the African Commission has
given normative content to some of the socio-economic rights in the
African Charter. The Commission has even gone ahead to read into the
Charter rights which are not expressly protected, such as rights to food
and shelter. The decisions also indicate increased reliance on standards
established by international human rights in the area of socio-economic
rights. In remedial terms, these decisions make clear and elaborate
recommendations that transcend the declaratory nature of the Com-
mission’s recommendations in previous cases.
The Purohit case, contrary to perceptions that the socio-economic
rights obligations in the African Charter are immediate, has defined the
obligations in a realistic manner, taking into account the resource con-
straints of African countries. This has brought the Charter very close to
CESCR. I have argued elsewhere that this is very important in as far as it
seeks to marry the regional human rights system with the international
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77 (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003).
78 See C Mbazira ‘The right to health and the nature of socio economic rights
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African Court with its jurisdiction to apply international instruments
ratified by the state. I will elaborate this point later. The Commission’s
progression has been driven by a number of factors. One of the factors
is its increased co-operation with human rights organisations both
within and outside Africa. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
have played a very important role, not only in filing communications,
but also in prosecuting them in a professional manner. NGOs have also
been sponsoring interns to provide technical assistance to the Commis-
sion. The NGOs have, on so many occasions, during the ordinary ses-
sions of the Commission, brought to the fore some of the human rights
problems in Africa. They have made statements, submitted research
reports and draft resolutions. All of these have helped in advancing
the normative understanding of the rights in the Charter. Some orga-
nisations with academic roots, such as the Centre for Human Rights at
the University of Pretoria, have engaged in high-level research on the
African human rights system and also trained students in the field. This
has increased academic knowledge and literature on the system.
However, in spite of the tremendous achievements realised at the
progression phase, a number of obstacles still have to be surmounted.
Full integration of the international human rights law standards is yet to
be realised. The weaknesses of the enforcement mechanisms are still an
impediment to the effectiveness of the African Commission. The Com-
mission continues to be under-funded and is still understaffed.
6.1.3 Major decisions during the progression phase
As already stated, the phase of progression is punctuated by two major
decisions, SERAC and Purohit. The difference between these decisions
and those during the redundancy phase is, first, the African Commis-
sion appears to have invested some research in writing the decisions.
Secondly, they are elaborate in the rights they protect. The SERAC case
goes as far as reading into the African Charter rights not explicitly
protected. Thirdly, there is some reference to international human
rights jurisprudence in the area of socio-economic rights at the UN
level. In remedial terms, the Commission goes beyond making declara-
tions of violations of rights; it makes comprehensive recommendations
of things that have to be done to remedy the violation. Recommenda-
tions include the repeal of legislation and the appointment of a com-
mission of inquiry and keeping the African Commission posted on the
measures adopted after the decision.
It could be argued that in these cases the Commission did not hes-
itate to make far-reaching recommendations because it knew that their
legitimacy would not arise since the decisions of the Commission have
persistently been ignored. The governments would then find it easy to
be indulgent to the recommendations since they are considered to be
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inconsequential.79 Indeed, as argued later, there is no evidence that
either SERAC or Purohit have been implemented. Of course it may be
too early to judge the implementation of Purohit.
The SERAC case arose from the exploitation of oil resources by the
Nigerian government, in partnership with Shell, in disregard of the
environment and health of the Ogoni people. The Nigerian govern-
ment had neither required environmental impact assessments nor
enforced an effective regulatory mechanism. The oil activities had led
to illnesses arising from environmental degradation. People’s protests
had been met with un-proportionate and brutal military force placed at
the disposal of Shell by the Nigerian government. Thousands of people
were evicted from their homes, their homesteads and farms destroyed
and livestock killed, leading to malnutrition and starvation.
Before going into the merits of the case, the African Commission
discussed, in general terms, the nature of the socio-economic rights
obligations engendered by the African Charter. Consistently with the
ideas of Shue,80 and as used by the UN Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Committee), the Commission stated that the rights
‘generate at least four levels of duties, namely the duty to respect,
protect, promote and fulfil’. ‘These obligations’, according to the Com-
mission, ‘universally apply to all rights and entail a combination of
negative and positive obligations.’81 The Commission then explained
each of the levels and in the context of article 2(1) of CESCR held that
sometimes the need to enjoy some of the rights requires concerted
action from the state in terms of more than one of the duties
above.82 These pronouncements, together with the statement that
there is no right in the African Charter that could not be made effective,
have been described as underscoring the justiciability and commitment
to enforce socio-economic rights by the African Commission.83
The Commission found that the actions of the Nigerian government
violated the right to a clean and healthy environment. This right, said
the Commission, requires the state to take reasonable legislative and
other measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, pro-
mote conservation and to secure an ecologically sustainable develop-
ment and use of resources.84 The Commission also referred to article 12
of CESCR and said that the government was under a duty to improve all
aspects of the environment, including industrial hygiene.
The Commission also found the state to have violated the right to
health. This right was linked to the right to a clean and healthy envir-
79 These arguments were brought to my attention by Prof Liebenberg and I acknowl
edge her in this respect.
80 H Shue Basic rights: subsistence, affluence, and US foreign policy (1980).
81 n 7 above, para 44.
82 Para 48.
83 Viljoen (n 63 above) 23.
84 n 7 above, para 52.
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onment, which at best required the government ‘to desist from carry-
ing out or sponsoring or tolerating any practice, policy or legal mea-
sures violating the integrity of the individual’.85 Compliance with these
two rights, according to the Commission, must also include ordering,
or at least permitting, independent scientific monitoring of the envir-
onment, and requiring and publicising of environmental and social
impact studies.86 The government of Nigeria had defaulted on all these.
The Commission condemned the failure of the government to pro-
tect its people from third party activities. The government had in fact,
instead, facilitated Shell’s violations by lending it its military power,
contrary to the African Charter and international obligations.87 Further
to this, the Commission declared that there was a violation of the right
of peoples to dispose of their wealth.88 In my opinion, it is necessary to
protect the peoples’ right to development, especially in the context of
increased globalisation of exploitation of natural resources without
regard to peoples’ rights. The right to dispose of wealth should be
linked to the right of peoples to self-determination and their capacity
to resist exploitation in the cultural context should be strengthened.89
The most innovative stance by the Commission is its reading into the
Charter of the rights to shelter and food, rights which are not explicitly
protected by the Charter. According to the Commission, the right to
food is implicitly recognised in such provisions as the right to life, the
right to health and the right to economic, social and cultural develop-
ment, which are expressly recognised under the Charter. This right,
held the Commission, is inseparably linked to the dignity of human
beings and is therefore essential for the enjoyment and fulfilment of
such other rights as health, education, work and political participa-
tion.90
Like the right to food, the Commission held that the right to housing
or shelter is implicitly recognised by the Charter. It reasoned that this
right could be derived from a combination of the provisions protecting
the right to health, the right to property, and the protection accorded
to the families. The Commission noted that the destruction of houses
adversely affects people’s property, their health and families. Further-
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right to be left alone and to live in peace — whether under a roof or
not.91
Regarding remedies, the Commission made extensive recommenda-
tions. It recommended that investigations be conducted, those respon-
sible for violations prosecuted and compensation paid to those who
had suffered. The Commission also recommended that an environmen-
tal and social impact assessment be carried out. The government was
urged to keep the Commission posted on the measures undertaken to
solve the problem.92 These are perhaps the most comprehensive
recommendations made by the Commission up to that date, which,
if enforced, would have gone a long way in vindicating the rights that
had been violated. The recommendations, if implemented, would have
also deterred future violations and established a relationship of trust
between the government and the people. Unfortunately, there is no
evidence that these recommendations were taken seriously by the gov-
ernment. The recommendations, when read together with the findings
on merit, lead one to conclude that the Commission can make very
strong declarations of rights and still move to establish a constructive
dialogue with the state on implementation of its recommendations.
However, the success of this move is dependent on the state’s willing-
ness to engage, in good faith, in such a post-decision dialogue.
The Purohit case was filed by two mental health advocates, on behalf
of mental patients at a psychiatric unit in The Gambia, and existing and
future mental health patients detained under the mental health laws of
the Republic of The Gambia. The complainants alleged that the provi-
sions of the Lunatic Detention Act and the manner in which mental
patients were treated amounted to a violation of various provisions of
the African Charter, including the right to health. It was alleged that the
Act failed to provide safeguards for patients who were (suspected of
being) insane during their diagnosis, certification and detention.
Among other things, it did not make provision for either review or
appeal against orders of detention and there was no remedy for erro-
neous detentions. No provision existed; it was argued, for the indepen-
dent examination of the administration, management and living
conditions within the unit itself.
In a rare feat, the Commission began by lambasting states for their
failure to defend communications. In spite of repeatedly having been
91 See paras 60 64. I have argued elsewhere that within the African context, there is a
strong link between the right to food and the right to shelter. Most African
communities survive on subsistence agriculture. Food sources are often close to their
houses. Some societies ensure food security by storing and preserving the excess of
their harvest in granaries, constructed with traditional techniques. Others plant crops
in such a manner that some mature before others, in order to ensure a steady supply
of food. Forced evictions and the denial of access to housing interfere with this
process; C Mbazira ‘Reading the right to food into the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights’ (2004) 5(1) ESR Review 5.
92 n 7 above, para 71.
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given time to file its response, the government of The Gambia filed its
submissions only two days before the consideration of the communica-
tion. The Commission stated that when states accede to international
instruments, they do so voluntarily and that having to make several
requests to states to file their submissions is troubling. According to
the Commission, this practice ‘not only seriously hampers the work of
the African Commission, but it also defeats the whole purpose of the
African Charter’.93 The Commission was especially perturbed by the
fact that the Secretariat of the Commission is situated in The Gambia.
On the merits, the Commission found The Gambia to be in violation
of a range of African Charter rights. It held that the Lunatic Detention
Act was discriminatory because the categories of people who would be
detained under it were likely to be people picked up from the streets
and people from poor backgrounds.94 Secondly, it was held that the
legislative scheme of the Act, its implementation and the conditions
under which persons were detained amounted to a violation of respect
for human dignity. Among other things, the Act used such terms as
‘idiots’ and ‘lunatics’ to describe persons with mental illness. Such ter-
minology, according to the African Commission, was dehumanising.95
On the right to health, the Commission held that the enjoyment of
this right is vital to all aspects of a person’s life and wellbeing and is
crucial to the realisation of all other rights. It held that this right requires
‘the right to health facilities, access to goods and services to be guar-
anteed to all without discrimination of any kind’.96 The Commission
held that mental health patients deserve special treatment because of
their condition and by virtue of their disability, they should be enabled
not only to attain but also sustain their optimum level of independence
and performance.97
The Lunatic Detention Act was found to be deficient in terms of its
therapeutic objectives and the provision of matching resources and
programmes for the treatment of persons with mental disabilities.98
The Commission relied heavily on the UN Principles for the Protection
of Persons with Mental Illness and Improvement of Mental Care (Prin-
ciples).99 The Principles accord special treatment to mental health
patients and stress that such patients are entitled to the highest stan-
dards of medical care at three levels: analysis and diagnosis, treatment
and rehabilitation. However, the Commission took note of the differ-
ence in standards between the Principles and the African Charter. While
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article 16 uses ‘best attainable state of mental health’, the Principles use
‘highest attainable standards’. But this was not viewed by the Commis-
sion as a bar to the application of the Principles, as there was nothing to
suggest that elaborating the right in the Charter in the direction of the
Principles was deficient.
The Commission took note of the relevance of resources and the
realities facing African countries in their efforts to realise the right to
health. According to the Commission:100
[M]illions of people in Africa are not enjoying the right to health maximally
because African countries are generally faced with problems of poverty which
renders them incapable to provide the necessary amenities, infrastructure
and resources that facilitate the full enjoyment of this right. Therefore, having
regard to this depressing but real state of affairs, the African Commission
would like to read into article 16 the obligation on the part of states party to
the African Charter to take concrete and targeted steps, while taking full advan-
tage of its available resources, to ensure that the right to health is fully realised in
all its aspects without discrimination of any kind.
The finding above establishes the fact that the availability of resources is
a relevant factor when determining whether a state is in violation of the
socio-economic rights in the African Charter. This case suggests that the
African Commission is leaning towards adopting standards the Com-
mittee has developed in its General Comments on the socio-economic
obligations under CESCR, especially General Comment No 3.101 As
noted earlier, socio-economic rights under CESCR are realisable pro-
gressively to the maximum of a state’s available resources. The Com-
mittee has interpreted this to mean that state parties must not take
retrogressive measures that have a negative impact on existing access
to socio-economic rights. It has also stated that states must comply with
minimum essential levels of socio-economic rights.
The approach adopted by the African Commission is justifiable, given
that the formulation of the rights in the African Charter is not substan-
tially different from that of CESCR. There is apparently no reason why
Africa should adopt a different standard, and one which appears to be
idealistic and out of touch with reality. In addition, CESCR has been
interpreted by the Committee in a manner that considers the position
of poor countries. For example, the Committee has held that states
seeking exemption from liability for not meeting their socio-economic
rights obligations on the ground of a lack of resources must demon-
strate that they have used the available resources to satisfy minimum
essential levels of socio-economic rights as a matter of priority.102
100 n 7 above, para 84 (my emphasis).
101 CommitteeonEconomic, Social andCultural Rights,GeneralCommentNo3,Thenature
of state parties’ obligations (5th session, 1990) UN Doc E/1991/23, annex III 86 (1991),
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 6 at 14 (2003).
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6.2 The phase of significant strides: The African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights
The commencement of operations by the African Court and its delivery
on socio-economic rights in my opinion represent a phase I would
describe as the phase of significant strides. Considering the calibre of
the persons that have been elected the first judges of the African Court,
and considering their experience in the area of international law, one
hopes that they will deliver quality judgments.103 The jurisprudence of
the African Court in the area of socio-economic rights is likely to have an
indelible impact on the African continent and to inspire the African
Commission and domestic courts. Contrary to belief that the African
Court will undermine domestic courts by establishing an extra-territorial
jurisdiction,104 the Court will strengthen human rights in all African
countries.
The African Court is empowered to apply the African ‘Charter and
any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the states con-
cerned’ as one of its sources of law.105 This is different from the African
Charter, which merely authorises the African Commission to seek
inspiration from international human rights law.106 This new move is
crucial as it seeks to integrate the global human rights system and the
regional system. This means that the Court will have to apply the stan-
dards of CESCR, in respect of states that have ratified it. But as I have
argued elsewhere, this integration presents a challenge to the African
Court because of the problem of permeability.107 Most international
treaties have their own monitoring bodies, which have interpreted
and applied such treaties. Inconsistent interpretation by other bodies
not charged with the implementation of a treaty may have fatal results.
Additionally, while there is a need for inspiration to be sought from
international human rights law, there is also the need to maintain the
identity of regional human rights treaties and to allow them to address
peculiar regional issues.
103 The Judges elected by the Executive Council of the AU on 21 January 2006 include:
Sophia Akuffo (Judge of the Supreme Court of Ghana); Fanoush Hamid Faraj (Member
of the Supreme Council of Justice Authority, Libya); Guindo Modibo Tounty (Judge of
First Instance of Timbukutu, Mali); Guisse El Hadji (Former Presiding judge of the
Court of Appeal of Senegal); George Kanieyamba (Justice of the Supreme Court of
Uganda); Kelello Mafoso Guni (Judge of the High Court of Lesotho); Jean Ngabishma
Mutsinzi (Judge of the Supreme Court of Rwanda); Bernard Ngoepe (Judge President
of the Transvaal Provincial Division, South Africa); Gérard Niyungeko (Professor of
Law, University of Burundi); Fatsa Ouguergouz (Secretary of the ICJ, The Hague); and
Jean Emile Somda (Member of the Constitutional Court, Burkina Faso).
104 See NB Pityana ‘Reflections on the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’
(2004) 4 African Human Rights Law Journal 121 124.
105 Art 7 (my emphasis).
106 Art 60.
107 Mbazira (n 78 above) 17.
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However, unless a situation presents absolutely peculiar circum-
stances, the universality of human rights should be promoted by the
interpretation of regional treaties in a manner consistent with interna-
tional human rights law. I have argued that this could be achieved if the
regional and international instruments are married. This would make it
possible to apply the norms proclaimed by universal standards without
making the international treaty a primary source of law.108 The marry-
ing process would integrate the instruments in a manner that does not
collapse the norms of one into another. In this, the normative nature of
the regional instruments would be enhanced, while at the same time
preserving their identity. Unless there is evidence of a need for a diver-
gent interpretation, the African Court will have to interpret the provi-
sions of the African Charter in a manner that is consisteny with
international law. This is not an easy task in the African Court’s enter-
prise of redeeming the poor.
However, there are still some very important challenges that the
African Court should face in its attempts to actualise the rights in the
African Charter. The most important challenge is to overcome the pro-
blem of non-enforcement of the judgments of the Court, as discussed in
the next section.
6.2.1 Enforcement of judgments
The success of the way into the phase of significant strides is, amongst
others, dependent on whether the African states respect and execute
the judgments of the African Court. The implementation of the recom-
mendations of the African Commission leaves a lot to be desired. The
recommendations have been ignored, not only by the state parties but
also by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Prominent
incidents include the stay of execution communications ignored, in a
flagrant manner, by some African states. Examples include the execu-
tion of Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian government in 1995 in spite of a
note verbale from the African Commission that the execution be halted
until the case has been heard by the Commission.109 Another example
is the 2001 execution of Mariette Bosch by Botswana authorities only
four days after the African Commission communicated its appeal for a
stay.110 In the area of socio-economic rights, in spite of the good
recommendation of the African Commission in the SERAC case, Ogoni-
land still experiences massive exploitation of oil in a manner that is
detrimental to the people. This could only mean that the recommenda-
108 As above.
109 n 67 above.
110 See L Chenwi ‘Towards the abolition of the death penalty in Africa: A human rights
perspective’ unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2005 178; see also
L Chenwi ‘The African Commission and the death penalty’ (2005) 11 Amicus Journal
13.
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tions of the Commission have not been implemented by the Nigerian
government.
Theoretically, the problems of the enforcement mechanism have
been surmounted by the enforcement procedures provided to the Afri-
can Court. The African Court Protocol enjoins state parties to comply
with the judgments of the African Court. By ratifying the Protocol, the
parties guarantee execution of the judgments.111 The AU Council of
Ministers is also enjoined to monitor execution of judgments of the
Court on behalf of the AU Assembly.112 The Court’s remedial mandate
is not restricted to making recommendations, but extends to ordering
‘payment of fair compensation or reparation’.113 Additionally, in cases
of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irrepar-
able harm to persons, the Court is empowered to adopt such provi-
sional measures as it deems necessary.114 What remains to be seen,
however, is whether this is going to be operationalised. This is because
the enforcement of decisions of international tribunals has always been
a problem in international law.
It is important to note that the enforcement of the decisions of the
African Court at the domestic level is not going to be an easy task. The
Protocol of the Court anticipates a reliance on good faith implementa-
tion on the part of the state. All it does is to require states to guarantee
execution of the judgments of the Court.115 Although the Court may
report to the AU Assembly cases which have not been executed,116
history shows us that the AU Assembly has always been very reluctant
to punish its members. While the Protocol compels the Council of
Ministers of the AU to monitor compliance with the judgment on behalf
of the Assembly,117 it is likely that the Council will await instructions
from the Assembly.
Without being pessimistic, it is unlikely that African states will enforce
the judgments in good faith. It is advisable that in its initial years, the
African Court should concentrate on influencing domestic courts. This is
because the domestic courts are closer to the people and closely linked
to domestic enforcement mechanisms; their role is likely to have a
bigger impact in comparison with the African Court — whose enforce-
ment mechanism may be somewhere in Addis Ababa.
Influencing the decisions of the domestic courts will also forestall
countermajoritarian accusations against the African Court. While the
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is evidence that it is being taken to the international stage.118 Counter-
majoritarian objections have been especially intense in respect of enfor-
cement of socio-economic rights because of their impact on
government policy and resources. With the proliferation of international
courts having a wide mandate, questions may be asked about their
legitimacy to direct domestic affairs in a manner that is inconsistent
with the wishes of the people. These concerns would be obviated if
the domestic courts assume the role of translating international norms
into domestic law using the jurisprudence of international courts. The
domestic courts have confronted the countermajoritarian dilemma and
appear to be succeeding in establishing appropriate balances. Establish-
ing such balances may be hard for international tribunals because they
operate outside the political contexts of a country and yet their inter-
vention is occasional.
7 Conclusion
The last 20 years of the African Charter have been mixed with losses and
gains in the area of socio-economic rights. In spite of the initial frustra-
tion of the African Commission with respect to enforcing the rights in
the African Charter, there is evidence that some gains have been made
in the area of socio-economic rights. The watershed decisions of SERAC
and Purohit have gone into some detail in elaborating the nature of the
obligations engendered by the socio-economic rights provisions of the
African Charter. Though the Commission’s enforcement mechanisms
remain weak, this void has, to a certain extent, been filled with the
establishment of the African Court. The Court has been given a wide
mandate and powers to issue binding judgments. What remains to be
done by the Court in the area of socio-economic rights is to pick up
from the gains of the Commission and to propel socio-economic rights
into the phase of significant strides.
Some obstacles, however, still have to be surmounted if the operation
of the Court and its judgments are going to have an impact. The
biggest obstacle is the enforcement of the judgments of the Court. In
its initial years of operation, the Court should aim at developing a
jurisprudence which has the capacity to influence the judgments of
domestic courts. This is because the domestic courts are close to the
enforcement mechanisms and are also likely to be able to issue more
meaningful and enforceable remedies.
118 See R Alford ‘Misusing international sources to interpret the Constitution’ (2004) 98
American Journal of International Law 57.
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